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1. Summary. Whether lessees of coal mining lands whose
leases are subject to termination on short notice without cause
are entitled to a depletion deduction under Sections 6ll(a) and
613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
2. Facts. The court below considered consolidated suits for
refund by three taxpayers, all resps here.

The essential facts

-

in each case are identical.

{

2 -

During the taxable years in

question, each taxpayer held one or more leases of coal-bearing
property and were engaged in the mining of coal therefrom.

The

-

leases were either of unstated durati nor duration for a term
of years.

Each lease contained a clause permitting either

,, .

party, or the lessor alone, to terminate the lease without

~,

cause on thirty days' notice.

Under the leases, taxpayers were

granted the right to extract coal from the specified property,
and to sell it to whomever they wished at whatever price they
chose.

The leases provided for payment of royalties (in one

case there was a flat annual rent as well) to the lessor based
on the coal extracted.

The extraction and sale of the coal

___________ ---

----

represented the sol~ source
of revenue from which the taxpayers
..........

-

could recover rents and royalties paid to the lessors.

In each

instance, the taxpayers had mined coal from the leaseholds in
question for a substantial time before~an~ during the taxable
years in question.
For each taxable year in question, the taxpayers claimed
deductions for depletion of coal reserves on the leasehold

rr-----------~--------

properties.

See I.R.C.

§

6Ll, 613 and Treas. Reg.

§

1.611-1

(26 C.F.R.) l [reproduced in an appendix to this memo.].
disallowed the deductions and assessed deficiencies.

The IRS
The

taxpayers paid the deficiencies and sued for refund in the Ct.
Cl.

/

3. Decision Below. The Ct. Cl. granted the taxpayers

relief.

It adhered to its earlier decision in Bakertown Coal

Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633 (1973), which had held on
similar facts that the right of lessors to terminate coal

;

,.

- 3 -

(

mining leases did not deprive the lessees of the kind of
"economic interest" in the minerals in place see Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933), that was required for entitlement
to a depletion deduction.

In this case, the court emphasized

the fact that the taxpayers had mined the respective properties
for______,
some time~ and it reasoned that the taxpayers "had a very
good expectation of being able to continue to do so," the
unexercised termination clauses notwithstanding.

The court

found evidence in the record that despite their legal power to
terminate, lessors of mining lands rarely do so in practice.
For the same reason, the court also rejected the
government's contention that the taxpayers did not qualify for
'-=,

depletion deductions because they would be unable to calculate

..___

-··--------·---------

either their interest in the coal or the portion of that

------- -----

interest that would be depleted during the taxable year.
-"'""..

The

court ruled that the strength of the taxpayers' expectations
that their leases would continue made it possible for them to
make these calculations.
J

~

Finally, the court stressed, as it had in Baker, that the
lessors would not be entitled to the depletion deduction.

~

''If ~ ~
~

[taxpayers] are not entitled, there will be no depletion on the~
coal mined under the leases . . . • Where ~

e can be no other ~

~~

claimant, we believe that neither the Internal Revenue Service -t-c__

~

nor the courts should be too technical or too harsh in finding ~
the only possible applicant to be ineligible."

I

~

4. Contentions. ·rhe SG argues that the Court should grant
cert. because the decision below is in conflict with decisions

~-t

~

- 4 -

on the same issue by other courts.

The leading case for a

contrary view is Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170

~ ~
~

1971}, with which the Baker case expressly disagreed.!/
Other cases following the CA 3's rationale include Costantin~
v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405, 409
Commi'ssioner,

u.

1971}; Mullins v.

(1967); Winters Coal Co. v.
(1971), rev'd on other grounds, 496
Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415

F.2d 995

v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594, 606-609 (1979).
In addition, the SG' states that several courts have indicated
that a lessor's right to terminate a lease is a significant
factor in determ-ining the lessee's entitlement· to a depletion
deduction.

United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (CA 4

1959}; McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (CA 4 1963); United
States v. Wade, 381 F.2d 345 (CA 5 1967).

See also Ramey v.

Commissioner, 47 T.C. 363, 375 (1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 478 (CA
6 1968); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (CA 9 1955);
Rissler & McMurry Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 684 (CA 10
1973).

I

Unless the Court grants cert. to resolve this

controversy, tax laws applicable to mining of mineral resources

will not be uniformly applied.
In the SG's view, the decision below is incorrect.

This

Court often has recognized that the purpose of the depletion
deduction is "to permit the owner of a capital interest in

1/ The SG says that the United States did not petition
for cert. in Baker because it was not then aware that the issue
would have recurring consequences of some financial magnitude.
In a supplemental memorandum, the SG states that there are
currently 12 cases
a,
.
h.
involving 1·n excess pen
ing
in
w
ich the issue has been raised,
of $1 million.

~

C)1.-3
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(

mineral in place to make a tax-free recovery of that depleting
capital asset."

Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 220 (1959).

The "economic interest" test was developed to determine whether
a taxpayer has the kind of capital investment in the mineral
resource that justifies allowing such a recovery.

As this

Court recognized in Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S.
362, 367 (1938), "the phrase 'economic interest' is not to be
taken as embracing a mere economic advantage derived from
production, through a contractual relation to the owner, by one
who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit."
The decision below misapplies the "economic interest" test
to taxpayers who derive only a "mere economic advantage" from
extraction of the mineral deposit.

Because of their right of

termination of the leases, it is the lessors, not the
taxpayers, who possess an economic interest in the coal in
place.

The importance of such a right of termination was

explicitly recognized by this Court's decision in Parsons v.
Smith, 359 U.S., at 595.

Other factors were also at play in

that case, but the Ct. Cl.'s attempt in Baker to distinguish
Parsons neglects the "economic reality" that the right of
termination has a profound effect on the continuity of the
taxpayer's interest in the mineral-bearing property.
Finally, the SG asserts that the Ct. Cl. placed too much
emphasis on the presumed inability of the lessors to claim the
depletion deduction.

Instead, the lessors receive capital

gains treatment of the revenues under Section 631(c) of the
I.R.C.

That treatment, like the depletion deduction, is

designed to permit recoupment of capital investment in the

-

6 -

minerals, and it too applies only where the "owner retains an
economic interest in such coal."

Commissioner v. Southwest

Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).

Accordingly, the

lessor is insured of making a tax-free recovery of the
depleting capital asset, and the purpose for which the
depletion deduction was created is served.
Resps argue that the SG overstates the asserted conflict.
The CA 3's position is directly contrary, but for 9 years no
other CA has followed it.

For a time the Tax Court agreed with

the CA 3; but recently it has been critical of the CA 3's view,
and in Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979), it allowed a
lessee to take a depletion deduction despite ah unexercised
termination clause with a 120-day notice period.

In addition,

the SG overdraws the financial significance of the issue; since
the Bakertown decision, most coal operators have been able to
renegotiate termination clauses of their leases to avoid the
problem, and in any event under the SG's theory the lessor
would be able to take the deduction if the lessee could not.
Resps further argue that the decision below is in harmony
with decisions of this Court.

The Court's definitive word on

the economic interest test came in Paragon Jewel Company, Inc.

v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965), which held that a lessee,
rather than the lessee's contractors, was entitled to a
depletion deduction for coal.

The Court reached this decision

despite the fact that the lease was "silent regarding
termination

"

Id., at 630.

Apparently, the Court did not

regard the presence or absence of terminability as a
controlling factor.

Resps note that Treasury regulations on

- 7 -

the availability of the depletion deduction have remained
virtually unchanged since they were issued after the Bankline
case, and they have never contained even a suggestion that
non-terminability of leases is a requirement for entitlement to
a depletion deduction.
Finally, resps argue that under the circumstances of these
cases no other taxpayer may claim the depletion deductions,
although in the Bull Run case the lessor did take capital gains
on its royalties.
5. Discussion. This case presents a clear-cut conflict on a
matter that is of at least some importance in the
administration of the tax laws.

Relative to this Court's prior

cases defining the scope of entitlement to the depletion
deduction, the issue framed by this case is of a rather
technical nature.

The parties seem to agree that terminability

of leases is a factor in determining whether a lessee has an
"economic interest" in the mineral in place; their disagreement
is over the factor's importance.

Moreover, the conflict has

been in existence for several years without producing any
untoward consequences.

This may be due, as resps suggest, to

the ability of mining lessees to modify the termination clauses
of their leases; or it may be due to careful forum shopping by
tax counsel.

Nevertheless, well reasoned opinions have been

written on both sides of the issue, and it is doubtful that the
matter will be fully resolved unless this Court decides it.
Accordingly, I recommend that cert. be granted.
There is a response.
4/29/80
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Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.):
SEC. 611.

Friedman
. FRIBDMAN

~e

APPENDIX ..

ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION
FOR DEPLETION.

(a) General Rule.-In the case of mines, bil
and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber,
there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing
taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case;
such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

:1
l

•
i

• • *

•
SEC. 613.

•

•

•

I'

I

PERCENTAGE DEPLETION.

(a) General Rule.-In the case of the mines,
wells, and other natural deposits listed in subsection (b), the allowance for depletion under section 611 shall be the percentage, specified in subsection (b) , of the gross income f ram the property excluding from such gross income an amount
equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred
by the taxpayer in respect of the property. Such
allowance shall not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayers' taxable income from the property ( computed without allowance for depletion). * * * In
no case shall the allowance for depletion under
section 611 be less than it would be if computed
without reference to this section.
·

•

------

'

•

•

•

•

,,

•

·--·-------- - - - - - - - - - - - _ : ___________

----·

Treasury Regulations on Income Tax (1954 Code)
(26 C.F.R.):
§ 1.611-1.

-

(

Allowance of deduction for de-pletion.

(a) Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells,
other natural deposits, and ti_Jy~ber-(1) In general. Section 611 provides that there shall be
allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income in the case of mines, oil and gas wells,
other .natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable
allowance for depletion. * * * In the case of other
exhaustible natural resources the allowance for
depletion shall be computed upon either the adjusted depletion basis of the property ( see section 612, relating to cost depletion) or upon a
percentage of gross income from the property
(see section 613, relating to percentage depletion), whichever results in the greater allowance
for depletion for any taxable year. In no case
will depletion based upon discovery value be
allowed.
*

"'

"'

"'

"'

(b) Economic interest. (1) Annual depletion
deductions are allowed only to the owner of an
economic interest in mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic interest is possessed in
every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by
investment any interest in mineral in place or
standing timber and secures, by any form of
legal relationship, income derived from the ex- ,.
traction of the mineral or severance of the
timber, to which he must look for a return of his
capital. For an exception in the case of certain
mineral production payments, see section 636 and
the regulations thereunder. A person who has

---......-----------·~ -

no capital investment in the mineral deposit or
standing timber does not possess an economic
interest merely because through a contractual
relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage derived from production. For example, an agreemci1t between the owner of an
economic interest and another entitling the latter
to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling the latter to compensation for
extraction or cutting does not convey a depletable
economic interest. Further, depletion deductions
with respect to an economic interest of a corporation are allowed to the corporation and not to its
shareholders.
·
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

.
;

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

December 8, 1980

Greg Morgan

No. 79-1515:

United States v. Swank, et al.

Question Presented
The question in this case is whether the lessee of a
mineral lease is entitled to a depletion deduction under§§ 611
d(a) and 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 •

•• -.-t....

,.

2.

Background
These three cases were consolidated in the Court of
Claims.

In each case, the lessee of a mineral lease claimed on

its tax returns a depletion deduction for coal mined from the
land covered by the

lease,

refund

the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue

action after

and

in each

the

lessee

brought a

Service (IRS) disallowed the deduction.
Elwood

Swank

striped-mined

coal

from

leased from Northumberland County, Pennsylvania.

land

that

he

According to

the lease, Swank paid to the county a royalty of 35 cents per
ton of mined coal.

Swank was free to sell the coal to whomever

he pleased and at whatever pr ice he could obtain.

The lease

was terminable upon notice by the county, without cause.
Black
land

that

either

a

whichever

it

Hawk

Coal

Corporation,

leased

from

a

monthly
was

rent

greater.

or

Inc.

private owner.
a

Black

royalty
Hawk

of

could

mined

coal

from

Black

Hawk

paid

per

ton,

25

cents

sell

the

whomever it pleased and at any price it could obtain.
party

to

the

lease

could

terminate

it

on

30

days'

coal

to :~

Either
notice,

without cause.
Bull Run Mining Co,

Inc.

that it leased from a private owner.

also mined coal from land
Bull Run paid a 25 cents

royalty per ton, and had to offer its coal to the leasor before
selling it on the open market.

This lease too was terminable

upon 30 days' notice, without cause.

3.
l l _ ~ ~ - - \

~~~~
The

Court

~~~

of

Claims

held

entitled to the refund they sought.

-

IRS

l (

that an

that

the

lessees

were

The court agreed with the

\. \

economic

interest in the minerals

in place

is a

prerequisite to an entitlement to the depletion deduction, but
the

court

rejected

the

IRS' s

argument

that

the

termination

clause in each lease deprived the lessees of such an economic
interest.
Because the Court of Claims' decision conflicted with
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971), the
granted the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari.

Contentions
A. Petitioner.
Petitioner

contends

that

the

lessees

(hereinafter

respondents) cannot claim a depletion deduction because they do
not have the requisite "economic interest"
place.

Petitioner

relies

on Palmer

v.

in the minerals in :

Bender,

287

U.S.

551

(1933), and Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938),
for

the

proposition

that

such

an

economic

interest

requires

more than the receipt of income derived from the extraction or
sale of minerals.

Petitioner contends that this is so because

the deduction is meant to provide a
impairment

of

capital

mineral deposit.

Thus,

resulting

tax-free recovery of the

from

the

exhaustion

petitioner contends,

the

of

claimant

the
to

the deduction must have a capital investment in the minerals in

~

4.

place

which

diminishes

extraction.
a

capital

in

value

as

a

consequence

of

the

In petitioner's view, respondents do not have such
investment

because

their

rights

to

extract

the

minerals are subject to termination upon notice, without cause.
Petitioner

therefore contends that these cases are controlled

by Parsons

v.

Smith,

359 U.S.

215

(1959),

and Paragon Jewel

Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
B. Respondents.
Respondents each claim that they have the requisite
economic

interest

in

the

minerals

in

place,

and

they

each

distinguish Parsons and Paragon Jewel on their facts.
(1)

Swank contends that he has an economic interest

in the minerals in place by virtue of owning an interest in the
minerals in place,
the

extraction

of

by investment, and by securing income from
the

minerals.

extraction is undisputed.

Swank's

income

from

the

His investment is in the equipment

and improvements necessary to effect the extraction.

His claim :~

of ownership relies upon the contention that his "lease" from
the county,

as

a

matter

of Pennsylvania

grant of an interest in the land itself."
v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 180 (1951).

law,

constitutes

Shenandoah Borough

Furthermore, Swank offers

two reasons why the termination clause

in his lease does not

negate his economic interest in the minerals in place.
Swank

contends

that

the

"a

termination

because his lease was never terminated.

clause

is

First,

immaterial

Second, Swank contends

that the termination clause is immaterial because Parsons and

5.

Paragon
apply

Jewel,

only

to

which
cases

place

some

weight

upon

terminability,

involving mining contractors and

not

to

cases involving lessees.
(2)

Black

Hawk

and

Bull

Run

reiterate

Swank's

arguments, and they further contend that the "controlling fact"
in their

cases

were never

is

that the termination clauses in the leases

invoked.

Accordingly,

they contend

that

there

is

nothing to negate the economic interest which they acquired in
the

minerals

in

place

by

investing

in

the

equipment

and

improvements necessary to mine the coal and then by mining the
coal to exhaustion.

Black Hawk and Bull Run also distinguish

Parsons and Paragon Jewel on the ground that those cases are
limited to mining contractors.

Discussion
I

am inclined to conclude that the Court of Claims

erred in finding that respondents are entitled to the depletion :~
deduction.
First, respondents are wrong to the extent that they
argue that Parsons and Paragon Jewel do not supply the legal
principle to be applied in this case.

Respondents are correct

that the claimants in those cases were contracting miners, not
lessees.
the

But the import of those cases is that entitlement to

deduction

turns

upon

the

particular

facts

of

the

contractual arrangement between the land owner and the claimant

6•

of

the

deduction,

whether

the

claimant

is

a

lessee

or

a

contracting miner.
Second,

respondents appear

to give

undue weight

the fact that the term i nation clauses were never executed.

to
The

fact remains that respondents' ability to extract and profit by
the coal was terminable at the will of the lessors.
fact,
]

I

find

Given that

it difficult to perceive that respondents had an

interest in the coal "in place."

In contrast, I can understand

~ that they had an economic interest in the extraction and in the
sale of the coal.
For

these

two

reasons,

I

am

inclined

to

recommend

accepting the Solicitor General's argument that respondents are
not

entitled

to

the depletiondeduction because they lack

requisite economic

interest.

I

the

therefore recommend reversing

the judgment of the Court of Claims.

:

,.
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No. 79-1515

UNITED STA TES, PETITIONER, v. EL WOOD SWANK
.ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF CLAIMS

3/z.q

[March--, 1981]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The owner of an economic interest in a mineral deposit is
allowed a special deduction from taxable income measured
by a percentage of his gross income derived from exhaustion
of the mineral. This deduction, codified in §§ 611 and 613
of the Internal Revenue Code, is designed to compensate
such owners for the exhaustion of their interest in a wasting
asset, the mineral in place.' This case presents the question
JUSTICE STEVENS

'"SEC. 61 l. Allowance of deduction for depletion:
"(a) General Rule-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural
deposits and timber, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing
taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation
-;7
of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such
/ ~ "'1-J
reasonable allowa.· nee in all cases to be made under regulations prescribed .
~~
by the Secretary.
.
t!f/t.- ~ _.. •
"SEC . ~13. Percentag~ depletion:

.

.

.

. .~

"(a) Gmeral Rule-In the case of the mines, wells, and other natural de- · 1 ~ - - , · posits listed in subsection (b), the allowance for depletion under§ 611 shall ~
be the percentage, specified in subsection (b), of the gross income from ~
the property excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any
rents or royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the propA.- A J_
erty. Such allowance shall not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's taxable in- ~ ~~
come from the property (computed without allowance for depletion).
* * * In no case shall the allowance for depletion under § 6 ll be less
than it would be if computed without reference to this section."
"(h) I'ercl'ntage depletion rates-The mines, wells, and other natural de-

I'

1-

--.--
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whether that "percentage depletion" allowance must be denied to otherwise eligible lessees of underground coal because their leases were subject to termination by the lessor
on 30-days notice.
This question arises out of three different tax refund suits
that were decided by the Court of Claims in a single opinion.
602 F. 2d 348. The controlling facts are essentially the
same in all three cases. Each taxpayer operated a coal mine
pursuant to a lease that provided for a fixed royalty per ton
to be paid to the lessor and which gave the lessee the right to
extract coal and to sell it at prices determined by the lessee.
Each lease contained a clause permitting the lessor to terminate the lease on 30-days notice. In fact, however, none of
the lessors exercised that right; each lessee mined a substantial tonnage of coal during an uninterrupted operation that
continued for several years. The proceeds from the sale of
the coal represented the only revenue from which the lessees
recovered the royalties paid to the lessors.
In each of the cases, certain additional facts help to illuminate the issue. In the Black Hawk' case the lease was to continue "during the term commencing on the first day of
March 1964, and terminating when lessee shall have exhausted all of The Feds Creek (or Clintwood) Seam of coal,
... or until said tenancy shall be earlier terminated .... "
App. 77a. The lease required Black Hawk to pay a royalty
of 25¢ per ton of coal or $5,000 per year, whichever was
larger. App. 77a-78a. In addition, the lease required
Black Hawk to pay all taxes on the underground coal, as well
as the taxes on its plant and equipment and on mined coal.
App. 79a. Black Hawk paid independent contractors a
posits, and the percentages, referred to in subsection (a) are as follows :
(4) 10%-Asbestos,. .. brucite, coal, lignite, perlite , sodium chloride,
and wollastonite .
' Black Hawk Coal Co., Inc. operated drift mines in Hike County, Kentucky . Its refund suit covered the tax years 1970-1972.

t
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. fixed price per ton to remove the coal, and Black Hawk was
free to sell the coal to any party at whatever price it could
obtain. Black Hawk mined the seam to exhaustion, operating continuously under the lease for 13 years. App.
70a-7la. The Government stipulated that Black Hawk was
the sole claimant to the percentage depletion deduction; no
claim had been made by the lessor or by any independent
mining contractor employed by Black Hawk. App. 7 la.
The Swank case involves two separate leases executed by
Swank and Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, pursuant to which Swank operated mines on land owned by the
County. The first lease, a deep mining lease executed in
1964, was terminated in 1968 after a mountain slide forced
Swank to close the mine. App. 52a. The second, a strip
mining lease executed in 1966, was still being operated by ·
Swank's successor in interest in 1977 when the case was
· tried. During the tax years in dispute, Swank's royalty payments to the County at the rate of $.35 a ton amounted to
$7,545.10 in 1966 and $6,854.05 in 1967. App. 53a. The
deduction for depletion, which was based on the gross income received from the sale of the coal, was significantly
larger." The record also indicates that Swank invested significant sums in the construction of access roads, the acquisition of equipment, and the purchase and improvement of a
"tipple"-the surface structure that is used to remove slate
and rock from the mined product and to sort the coal into
specific sizes for marketing. App. 55a- 56a.
The Bull Run' case involves a five-year lease executed in
1967 and renewed in 1972. App. 90a- 9la. Unlike the
"The Govermenl states that the depletion deductions claimed by
Swank in 1966 and 1967 amounted to $41,371.24 and $15,204.32. App .
53a. No other party claimed Lhe depletion deduction · on coal mined by
Swank.
'Bull Run Mining Co. operaled in West Virginia. In ils bt ief, Bull
Run states that the leased coal was mined to exhaustion in September
1978.
Brief for Respondent Bull Run Mining Co. 2.

.
;

,.
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leases in the other cases, it gave the lessor a right of first purchase if it was willing to meet the lessee's price, and in the tax
year in dispute the lessor did purchase all of the coal mined
by Bull Run. 602 F. 2d, at 350, n. 4. The lease did not,
however, limit the lessee's right to set selling prices or to sell
to others who were willing to pay more than the lessor. Ibid.
Like the lease in Black Hawk, the lease provided for a royalty of25¢ per ton. App. 9 la. As is also true in both Black
Hawk and Swank, there is no suggestion that any other party
has made any claim to any part of the percentage depletion
allowance at issue in this case." See app. 92a. The Bull
Run lease, like the others, contained a provision giving the
lessor the right to cancel on 30-days written notice."

I
Since 1913 the Internal Revenue Code has provided special deductions for depletion of wasting assets. We have explained these deductions as resting "on the theory that the
extraction of minerals gradually exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit," and therefore the depletion
allowance permits "a recoupment of the owner's capital investment in the minerals so that when ·the minerals are ex·, Bull Run claimed a depletion deduction of $39,981.41 for 1974, the
lax year in question. App. 92a.
"The relevant section of the lease provides:
"CANCELLATION. It is agreed between the parties that either party to
this agreement may cancel this lease upon giving to the other party a written notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of said cancellation. If any coal is mined during said thirty (30) clay period, the same
shall be paid for the same as if said notice were not given, and upon the
expiration of said thirty (30) days, Lessee agrees to deliver the possession
of said premises to the Lessor. Upon such cancellation becoming effective, Lessor shall reasonably compensate Lessee for the then fair market
value of track, conveyors, dumps, bins, motors and other equipment
which Lessee shall have allixed to the premises, and if the parties cannot
agree upon such compensation, Lessee shall have a period of four (4)
months within which to remove his equipment, from the effective date of
cancellation." Aµp. 96a.
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hausted, the owner's capital is unimpaired." Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312. 7 The percentage depletion allowance, however, is clearly more than a
method of enabling the operator of a coal mine to recover
the amount he has paid for the unmined coal. Because the
deduction is computed as a percentage of his gross income
from the mining operation and is not computed with reference to the operator's investment, it provides a special incentive for engaging in this line of business that goes well beyond a purpose of merely allowing the owner of a wasting
asset to recoup the capital invested in that asset: As the
Court said in Southwest Exploration Co., supra:
"The present allowance, however, bears little relationship to the capital investment, and the taxpayer is not
limited to a recoupment on his original investment.
The allowance continues so long as minerals are extracted, and even though no money was actually invested in the deposit. The depletion allowance in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 [the forerunner of the
present statute] is solely a matter of Congressional
grace; .... " 350 U.S., at 312."
'In Helvrring v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362,366, the Court explained that the deduction "is permitted in recognition of the fact that the
mineral deposits are wasting assets and is intended as compensation to the
owner for the part used up in production."
"The Swank case is illustrative of the nature of the depletion deduction.
We can determine from the fact that. Swank paid royalties of $7,545.10 in
1966 and $6,854.05 in 1967 that Swank mined roughly the same amount
of coal in both years, 21,557 tons in 1966 and 19,585 tons in 1967. Thus
Swank could apparently claim a depletion allowance of about $1.92 per
ton in 1966 and about $. 78 per ton in 1967. Inasmuch as the depletion
allowance is a percentage of gross income, these figures-which suggest
that the selling price of the coal may have been almost as high as $20.00 a
ton-indicate the lack of any specific relationship between the lessee's cost
of the raw coal and the value of the depletion allowance.
"In the Revenue Act of 19 J8, the capital to be recovered through the
depletion allowance was not determined by the owner's investment in the
minerals but rather was measured by the fair market value of the property

.
;

,.
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Hence eligibility for the deduction is determined not by the
amount of the capital investment but by the mine operator's
"economic interest" in the coal.'"
A recognition that the percentage depletion allowance is
more than merely a recovery of the cost of the unmined coal
is especially significant in this case. The question here is
whether a deduction for the asset depleted by respondents
will be received by anyone." The tax consequences of the
at the date the tnineral deposits were "discovered." See Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, §§214 (a) (10), 234 (a) (9), 40 Stat. 1068, 1078. Although
this method of determining the depletion allowance was changed in l 92 ~
to the percentage depletion method, this Court, in Helvering v. Bankline Oil
Co., 303 U.S. 362, 366-367, recognized that "[t]he granting of an arbitrary deduction, .... of a percentage of gross income was in the interest of
convenience and in no way altered the fundamental theory of the
allowance." Thus the depletion deduction has never been strictly limited
to a recoupment of the operator's investment.
'" The Court developed the "economic interest" test in Palmer v. Bender,
287 U.S. 551,557. In Palmer, the Court stated:
"The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for
every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest
in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income
derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return
of his capital."
11
The Government argues that the Court of Claims erred in concluding
that a consequence of the Government's position is that no one will receive
the percentage depletion deduction. See 602 F. 2d, at 35 l; Brief for Petitioner 22-23. This argument is not persuasive.
Under§ 631 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, the lessor is required to
treat his royalty income as a capital gain and is not entitled to claim a percentage depletion deduction. Section 631 (c) provides in pertinent part:
"In the case of the disposal of coal (including lignite), or iron ore mined
in the United States, held for more than 9 months before such disposal, by
the owner thereof under any form of contract by virtue of which such
owner retains an economic interest in such coal or iron ore, the difference
between the amount realized from the disposal of such coal or iron ore
and the adjusted depletion basis therof plus the deductions disallowed
from the the taxable year under § 272 shall be considered as though it
were a gain or loss, as the case may be, on the sale of such coal or iron ore.
S 11ch. oww'r shall not b1' entit/Nl to the allowance for fJercentage depletion providl'd

LP
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I

lessors' receipt of royalties will not be affected, either favorably or unfavorably, by our decision in this case.'" The Government therefore is not contending that the wrong party is
claiming the percentage depletion allowance. Rather, the
Government takes the position that no such deduction shall
be allowed to any party if the legal interest of the lesseeoperator is subject to cancellation on short notice.''
in § 613 with respect to such coal or iron ore. This subsection shall not apply
to .income realized by any owner as a co-adventurer, partner, or principal
in the mining of such coal or iron ore, and the word "owner" means any
person who owns an economic interest in coal or iron ore in place, including a sublessor." 26 U. S. C. § 631 (c) (Emphasis added).
Unlike the percentage depletion deduction, the capital gains treatment
required by § 631 (c) is directly related to the lessor's capital investment in
the mine. BecatJse the lessor's gain is measured by the difference between his cost, computed on a per ton basis, and his royalty, he of course
recoups his capital investment as the coal is mined. · In this sense, he receives "cost depletion." The difference between the lessor's "cost depletion " and the lessee's "percentage depletion" is indicated by the record in
the Swank case. In 1966 the royalty payments amounted to $7,545. l O; a
part of that amount was the lessor's capital gain and the remainder was his
"cost depletion." In contrast, the "percentage depletion" claimed by the
lessee amounted to $41,371.24. The amounts are not in dispute. Thus,
contrary to the Government's argument, the provision of capital gains
treatment to the lessor does not indicate that the percentage depletion deduction, which we have characterized as a form of "Congressional grace,"
will be available to some other party if it cannot be claimed by the lessee.
Seen. 12, infra.
" The Government conceded at oral argument that the lessor's entitlement to the capital gain treatment of the royalty proceeds would be the
same regardless of whether the lessee is entitled to percentage depletion.
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. Moreover, the Government also conceded that
even if the the lessees had a long term lease and were clearly entitled lo
the depletion allowance, the lessors would nevertheless have a retained
economic interest in the coal. Id. at 16-18. Therefore, the lessors would
be required by § 631 (c) to take capital gains rather than a depletion deduction regardle.ss of whether we hold that the lessee is entitled to the percentage depletion deduction.
r, Although these cases involve provisions for cancellation on 30-day no- ·
tice. the Government advises us that it takes the same position with respect
to any lease cancellable on less than one year's notice. Tr. of Oral Arg., at

.
;

,.
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II
The language of the controlling statute makes no reference to the minimum duration of the interest in mineral deposits on which a taxpayer may base his claim to percentage
depletion.
The relevant Treasury regulation merely requires the taxpayer to have an "economic interest" in the
unmined coal.'" That term is broadly defined by regulation
as follows:
11

"(b) Economic interest. (I) Annual depletion deductions
are allowed only to the owner of an economic interest in
mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer
has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in
place or standing timber and secures, by any form of
legal relationship, income derived from the extraction
of the mineral or severance of the timber, to which he
must look for a return of his capital."";
The Government's argument that the termination clause deprived the lessees of an economic interest is advanced in two
forms. First, the Government notes that the regulation dis8. This posiLion has its genesis in G. C. M. 26290, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 42,
declared obsolete, Rev . Rul. 70-507, 1974 Cum. Bull. 280. See also Rev.
Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 179.
'' See n. l, supra.
r:, The Court early recognized that lessees had an economic interesl in
Lhe mines:
"It is, of course, true that the leases here under review did not convey
title to the unextracted ore deposits, ... ; but it is equally true that such
leases, conferring upon the lessee the exclusive possession of the deposits
and the valuable right of removing and reducing the ore to ownership,
created a very real and substantial interest therein .... And there can be
110 doubt that such an interest is property." Lynch v. A/worth-Stephens Co.,
21i7 U. s. :164, '.1(i!).
W2(i CFR § I.GI 1-1 (b).

"
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tinguishes a mere "economic advantage" 11 from a depletable
"economic interest," and argues that two cases-Parsons v.
Srnith, 359 U.S. 215, and Paragon jewel Coal Co. v. Cornmissioner, 380 U. S. 624-in which the Court concluded that
mining contractors had only an "economic advantage"
rather than an "economic interest" in coal deposits-support
the conclusion that these lessees also had a mere "economic
advantage." Second, the Government argues as a matter of
"practical economics" that the right to terminate gives the
lessor the only significant economic interest in the coal.
Neither submission is persuasive.
The Parsons opinion covered two consolidated cases with
similar facts. In each the owner of coal bearing land entered. into a contract with the taxpayer providing that the ·
taxpayer would strip mine the coal and deliver it to the
owner for a fixed price per ton. Neither of the contracts
purported to give the mining contractor any interest in the
coal, either before or after it was mined, or any right to sell it
to third parties. See 359 U.S., at 216-219. The contracts
were terminable on short notice and terminability was one of
the seven factors the court listed to support its conclusion
that the independent contractors did not have an economic
· interest in the coal.'" It is perfectly clear, however, that the
" The regulation provides an example of such an "economic
advantage":
"[A]n agreement between the owner of an economic interest and another entitling the latter to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling the latter to compensation for extraction or cutting does
not convey a depletable economic interest." Id.
" The coun listed the seven factors in this paragraph:
"To recapitulate, the asserted fiction is opposed to the facts (1) that petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all of which was movablenot in the coal in place; (2) that their investments in equipment were recoverable through depreciation-not depletion; (3) that the contracLi were
r0111/1ll'lf'ly /aminable without cause on short notice; (4) that the landowners did
not agree to surrender and did not actually surrender to petitioners any
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Court would have reached the same conclusion if that factor
had not been present.
The facts in the Paragon jewel case were much like those in
Parsons, except that the mining contractors dealt with lessees
instead of the owners of the underground coal. As in Parsons, the contractors agreed to mine the coal at their own expense and deliver it to Paragon's tipple at a fixed fee per '
ton.'" The contractors had no control over the coal after
delivery to Paragon, had no responsibility for its sale or in
fixing its price, and did not even know the price at which
Paragon sold the coal. 380 U.S., at 628. The Court stated
that the Commissioner took the position that:
"[O]nly a taxpayer with a legally enforceable right to
share in the value of a mineral deposit has a depletable
capital interest in the coal in place; (5) that the coal at all times, even after
it was mined, belonged entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners
could not sell or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they
mined to the landowners; (6) that petitioners were not to have any part of
the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the contrary, they were to be
paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and delivered, which was, as stated i1,1
Huss, agreed to be in 'full compensation for the full performance of aH
work and for the furnishing of all [labor] and equipment required for the
work'; and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the landowners
[or all sums to become due them under their contracts. The agreement
of the landowners to pay a fixed sum per ton for mining and delivering
the coal 'was a personal covenant and did not purport to grant [petitioners] an interest in the [coal in place].' Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S.
370, 372. Surely these facts show that petitioners did not actually make
any capital investment in, or acquire any economic interest in, the coal in
place, and that they may not fictionally be regarded as having done so."
395 U.S., at 225 (Emphasis added).
''' Although this fee ".aried depending on the general trends of the market price and labor costs, the Court noted that such changes "were always
prospective, the contractors being notified several days in advance of any
change so that they always knew the amount they would get for the min~
ing of the coal upon delivery." 380 U.S., at 628.
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capital or economic interest in that deposit and the contract miners in this case had no such interest in the
unmined coal." Id., at 627.
The Court agreed that the miners did not have an economic
interest in the coal:
"Here, Paragon was bound to pay the posted fee regardless of the condition of the market at the time of the
particular delivery and thus the contract miners did not
look to the sale of the coal for a return of their investment, but looked solely to Paragon to abide by its covenant." Id., at 635.
Thus in Paragon Jewel Coal Co., as in Parsons, the terminability of the agreements was not the dispositive factor,"" and
neither case answers the narrow question before us in this
case.2'
The contrast between the interest of the contractors in
Parsons and Paragon and the lessees in these cases is stark.
Whereas those contractors never acquired any legal interest
in the coal, the lessees in these cases had a legal interest in
the mineral both before and after it was mined, and were
'" With respect to the terminability issue, although no specific right to
terminate was mentioned in the agreement, the Paragon Jewel Court concluded that because the contractors had apparently been able to terminate
at will, such a power should also be imputed to Paragon. The Court indicated, however, that even if the agreements were not terminable at will,
the "right to mine to exhaustion, without more, does not constitute an economic interest under Parsons." id., at 634.
"Another distinguishing feature of Paragon jewel is that that case really
presented an issue respecting which taxpayer-the contract miner or the
lessee-should receive the depletion allowance. See 380 U. S., at 626,
630; id., at 639-649 (Goldberg,]., dissenting). The fact that the existence
of a right to terminate is relevant in what is esentially a dispute between
the parties to the contract surely does not support the conclusion that such
an unexercised right has any bearing on the question whether any taxpayer may claim percentage depletion.

;

,.
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free to sell the coal at whatever price the market could bear.
Indeed, the Government does not contend that, absent the
termination clauses, the lessees would not have had an economic interest in the coal. In contrast, it seems clear that
the contract miners' interest in the Parsons and Paragon cases
would have been insufficient even if their agreements had
been for a fixed term.
The Government, however, does argue that the lessors'
right to terminate the leases alone made the taxpayers' interest so tenuous as to defeat a claim to the percentage depletion deduction."" According to the Government, as a matter
of "practical economics" an increase in the price of the minerals will "assuredly" lead to an exercise of the lessor's right
to terminate; accordingly, the only significant economic interest is controlled by the lessor. We find this theoretical argument unpersuasive for at least three reasons.
First, the royalty rate is a relatively small element of the
mine operator's total cost."' Therefore, even if the price of
coal increases, the lessor cannot be certain that he will be
able to negotiate a more favorable lease with another lessee.

.
;

""Although he has a potential right to benefit from a rise in the market, that right is illusory for practical economics will compel the lessor to
terminate the lease and conclude a more favorable arrangement if market
conditions so dictate ." Brief for Petitioner 19.
"As we have pointed out (supra , p. 19), if the market price of the minerals rises above the lessor's royalty, the lessor will assuredly exercise his
right to terminate the lease on short notice and will either enter into a
more profitable lease or extract the mineral himself and sell it. In these
circumstances, the lease provision permiuing termination on short notice
gives the lessor the unilateral right to assume complete and unfettered dominion over the mineral deposit, viz., an economic interest in the minerals
in place. The unexercised termination clause therefore has profound
economic significance, rather than , as the decision below erroneously concluded (Pet. App : 5a), "mere existence." Id., at 21 - 22 (footnotes
omitted) .
" ln Swank , for example, th_e royalty payment was 25¢ per ton, while
the price of coal apparently approached $20.00 per ton. Seen. 8, supra.

,.
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Moreover, the quantity of coal extracted by the operator
each year may be as important in providing royalties for the
lessor as the rate per ton. Purely as a theoretical matter, it
therefore is by no means certain that an increase in the price
of coal will induce a lessor to terminate a satisfactory business relationship. · Indeed, the only evidence in the
record-the history of three different operations that were
uninterrupted for many years-tends to belie the Government's entire argument!'
Second, from the standpoint of the' taxpayer who did in
fact conduct a prolonged and continuous operation, it would
seem rather unfair to deny him a tax benefit that is available
to his competitors simply because he accepted a business
risk-the risk of termination-that his competitors were able
to avoid when they negotiated their mining leases. It is unlikely that Congress intended to limit the availability of the
percentage depletion deduction to the mining operations
with the greatest bargaining power.
Third, and most important, the Government has not suggested any rational basis for linking the right to a depletion
deduction to the period of time that the taxpayer operates a
mine. If the authorization of a special tax benefit for mining a seam of coal to exhaustion is sound policy, that policy
would seem equally sound whether the entire operation is
" The Court of Claims opinion also recognized the weakness of this argument. The court stated that counsel for one of the taxpayers at oral
argument had noted that the lessors had not terminated even though the
value of coal had increased markedly. The taxpayer argued that lessors
would be reluctant to terminate because "the costs of continuing with an
existing mine are usually so great, comparatively, that it is difficult for a
lessor to obtain new lessees at terms more favorable to the lessors than the
existing leases." 602 F. 2d, at 351, n. 9. The court did not accept these
representations as evidence but indicated that "the record contains nothing Lo contradict this explanation for what seems to be the fact that leases
of this type have not been regularly cancelled by lessors in recent years."
Ibid.

·.
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conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a
series of taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods.
The Government has suggested no reason why the efficient
removal of a great quantity of coal in less than 30 days
should have different tax consequences than the slower removal of the same quantity over a prolonged period!"
The Court of Claims correctly concluded that the mere
existence of the lessors' unexercised right to terminate these
leases did not destroy the taxpayers' economic interest in the
leased mineral deposits.
The judgment is affirmed.

,·,As we have indicated, the depletion deduction is geared to the deple1ion of the mineral in place, and not to the taxpayer's capital investment.
Therefore, we can perceive no reason to impose duration requirements
on the availability of the deduction for taxpayers who admittedly otherwise have an "economic interest" in the coal, are dependent on the market
to recover their costs, and are actually depleting the mineral in place.
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Sincerely,

---

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR.
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RE:

No. 79-1515 United States v. Swank

~
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Dear John:
,,

I agree.

..
'

Si~

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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~rurJrngion, , . ~ 20ffeJ!. ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

'
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March 30, 1981

Re:

_No. 79-lil~JL_S. v. Swank

Dear John,
I shall await Byron's possible dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 1, 1981

Re:

No. 79-1515 - United States v. Swank

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~•

T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 5, 1981

Re:

j

No. 79-1515, U.S. v. Swank

Dear Byron,
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

May 7,

79-1515 - United States v. Swank

Dear John:
I join.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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